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 In “Refusing White Privacy” I look at theories in White Data and Surveillance Studies 
around what data is, how it is made to exist, and for whom, in order to intervene in the 
conceptualization of  data as an inevitable residue of  human life and relationship. Through this 
intervention, I show that the alleged crises of  privacy ushered in by allegedly non-racial smart 
technologies (a preoccupation in WDSS) is underwritten by racializing technologies from the 
Antebellum era to the present. 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A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY 
 In this paper I use the term white Data and Surveillance Studies (WDSS) to name the 
dominant strand of  Data and Surveillance Studies in which race/gender/sexuality/ability/status/
and environment are taken as ‘other’ elements of  the world, apart from data and surveillance, that 
can be analyzed in relation to data and surveillance as intersecting areas of  interest. In WDSS, race/
gender/sexuality/ability/status/environment are not seen as foundational to the logics of  data and 
surveillance that emerge in tandem with the modern world/bureaucratic state and market.  1
 To give a concrete, if  not banal example that is characteristic of  WDSS, here is an 
endorsement that David Lyon, the Director of  the Surveillance Studies Centre at Queen’s University 
and a leading scholar in WDSS, wrote for the 2015 volume Feminist Surveillance Studies: “surveillance 
cannot but be about social sorting, so it must also always be about inequalities. This book prods and 
provokes its readers to focus critically on those inequalities so that the study of  surveillance never 
slips into complacency or complicity” (Dubrofsky and Magnet, 2015). For contrast, Feminist 
Surveillance Studies self-describes its contributors as using feminist theory “to expose the ways in 
which surveillance practices and technologies are tied to systemic forms of  discrimination that serve 
to normalize whiteness, able-bodiedness, capitalism, and heterosexuality” (2015). In Lyon’s terms, 
surveillance is about social sorting and inequality, and yet the study of  surveillance can slip into 
complacency or complicity if  it does not focus on social sorting and inequality. What then would be 
the focus of  surveillance studies, if  it did not focus on surveillance? In my terms, this logic of  
 Here I am referring to conceptions of  ‘the modern world/bureaucratic state and market’ from 1
Black studies, specifically from the works of  Paul Gilroy and Cedric Robinson, who theorize 
modernity and the capitalism from transatlantic slavery through their concepts of  the Black Atlantic 
and racial capitalism respectively. In their concepts, Blackness as both real object and object of  
knowledge is not marginal to modernity and the market, rather it is central to and enmeshed with 
modernity and the market. 
In WDSS and other fields deploying white ‘universalist’ conceptions of  the world, ‘the modern 
world/bureaucratic state and market’ is theorized as a central social, political and economic break in 
history that in non-racial, occurring alongside ‘developments’ in race and ethnicity that are marginal 
to it.
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separating the study of  something form the thing itself  is part of  the practice of  WDSS, wherein 
relation and sociality are expressed as objects of  study and part of  a white temporal logic of  
temporariness, as in white people feeling “temporarily bad about black suffering” (Rankin, 2015). In 
WDSS Blackness and anti-Blackness can be studied temporarily, but never orient the study of  white 
data and surveillance towards the abolition of  an anti-Black world. 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INTRODUCTION 
 In this paper I place Blackness and anti-Blackness at the foundations of  the modern world/
bureaucratic state and market. I look at theories in WDSS around what data is, how it is made to 
exist, and for whom, in order to intervene in the conceptualization of  data as an inevitable residue 
of  human life and relationship. Through this intervention, I show that the alleged crises of  privacy 
ushered in by allegedly non-racial smart technologies (a preoccupation in WDSS) is underwritten by 
racializing technologies from the Antebellum era to the present. By looking as far back as the 
Antebellum era, I connect racializing technologies during slavery to racializing smart technologies 
today, and demonstrate that white privacy requires the destruction of  Black sociality through the 
racialization, capture and representation of  Blackness as criminality and property. 
 In section one, “Data as Capture,” I intervene in the popular idea in WDSS that data – 
meaning ‘a thing given’ – would be better known as capta, or ‘a thing taken.’ I discuss how this 
inversion or antonym maintains the premise that data exists whether it is made to or not. I challenge 
this premise by following the etymological method that scholars in WDSS have used to arrive at 
capta, and come myself  instead to the word captive. Beyond of  the binary of  give and take that 
WDSS establishes, my use of  the word captive grounds data and surveillance in racial hierarchies. 
Centering the captive, I examine the relationship between racism – “the state-sanctioned or 
extralegal production and exploitation of  group-differentiated vulnerability to premature 
death” (Gilmore, 247) – and machine learning to demonstrate how white theories of  ‘artificial 
intelligence’ maintain and protect privacy as property ownership. I analyze data in the context of  the 
algorithmic analysis it makes possible to reflect on networked carceral technologies and predictive 
policing as technologies that code carceral space. 
 In section two, “Code/space,” I perform a counter-reading of  the term code/space, a 
keyword and theory in WDSS introduced by geographers Rob Kitchin and Martin Dodge. Kitchin 
and Dodge discuss private or home space prior to computer code as a space of  sanctuary, 
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possession and security. In contrast, code/space breaches the privacy of  home space and private 
property ownership through the intrusion of  the market into the domestic sphere. This intrusion 
breaks the barrier between public spaces of  production, and private spaces of  reproduction. Code/
space as theorized by Kitchin and Dodge assumes that the user or inhabitant of  code/space as self-
possessing and free, that code/space does not impact the physical body or flesh of  the human user 
or inhabitant. To counter this conception of  code/space and privacy that does not address the body, 
I analyze technologies of  e-carceration including ‘risk assessment’ software, ankle monitors, and 
house arrest apps that are transforming home spaces through code in predominantly Black and 
Brown communities. Through code/spaces of  e-carceration, I draw an expanded time-line of  
WDSS that traces code, data and surveillance to the Antebellum era and racial slavery. I connect 
capture and e-carceration to the coding of  the Black body as property, specifically in the capture of  
the reproductive systems and interiority of  enslaved women of  African descent. In my reading of  
carceral space across time, I aim to connect private spaces of  white sociality and sovereignty to the 
practices of  anti-Black capture that define carceral space. 
 In the last section, “The Mobilization of  White Privacy,” I follow the time-space named by 
“plantation futures” (McKittrick, 2013) to relate digital computing and white privacy to an older 
technology, analogue photography, that created and secured code/space and generated criminal 
databases long before the advent of  digital computer code and algorithms. I look at a specific 
moment in American history at the end of  the 19th century when the technology of  analogue 
photography was becoming mobile and increasingly ubiquitous in urban areas. As studio 
photography ceased to be the dominant site of  photographic capture, and street or candid 
photography began its takeover, propertied whites questioned how to address the threat posed by 
nonconsensual photographic representation to their own privacy and experience of  self-possession. 
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DATA AS CAPTURE 
 To enter the question of  what data is, how it is made to exist, and for whom, I take up a 
frequently cited etymological intervention from WDSS. In this intervention, WDSS scholar Rob 
Kitchin explores the etymology of  the word data. Kitchin notes that data is a Latin word that means 
“a fact given,” from the Latin verb dare, meaning “to give” (2014, 2). Citing sociologist Howard 
Becker, Kitchin suggests that data is a misnomer and that capta, from the Latin verb capere meaning 
“to take, seize,” would more accurately describe what “we” refer to when “we” say data (2). This 
gesture is part of  a movement in WDSS to critically interrogate the notion that data is freely given. 
Through capta, scholars in WDSS consider that individuals own or possess their own data before it is 
taken by either private or public institutions, usually without compensation other than the alleged 
improvement of  services for the individual as consumer/user/citizen. While purporting to 
recognize that data is taken, WDSS scholars continue to treat data as given: something that exists 
‘naturally’ in and of  the world, that can be taken with or without consent. 
 In his discussion of  etymology and the word data, Kitchin cites a passage by Jensen, quoted 
in Becker (1952), to establish a scholarly precedent for thinking capta: 
It is an unfortunate accident of  history that the term datum…rather than captum…
should have come to symbolize the unit-phenomenon in science. For science deals, 
not with ‘that which has been given’ by nature to the scientist, but with ‘that which 
has been taken’ or selected from nature by the scientist in accordance with his 
purpose, and to a degree even constructed out of  nature by the scientist’s 
preliminary assumptions as to which of  “the things which have been given” are also 
to be “taken” or observed. 
The excerpt up to word “purpose” has been widely circulated since Kitchin’s 2014 book The Data 
Revolution. However, when I focus on the remainder of  the except, I see an emphasis on the 
relationship between the scientist’s conception of  self  as observer/taker, and the scientist’s 
perception of  ‘everything else’ as observable/given. This relationship conceives of  a subject whose 
faculties of  perception turn others into objects whose being is for the subject. Following this logic, 
data is like air, it is always around, but is encountered by the breather only when they breathe, 
!5
although their act of  breathing is inevitable and involuntary, or given. As if  the scientist cannot help 
but take that which they observe. Following Kitchin’s venture into etymology, I want to see what 
other meanings can be derived from capere in relation to data and surveillance to destabilize the 
binary of  give and take. 
 Alongside its meaning “to take, seize,” capere is also the root of  the word Perceive. Perceive 
comes from the Latin verb percipere, meaning to seize and understand, from per (entirely) + capere (to 
take, seize). Read in relation to “to take, seize,” perception is not a neutral onto-biological 
phenomenon the occurs in the space of  exchange between observer and observed. Rather as a 
biosocial affect, it is grounded in sociogeny, Frantz Fanon’s term that intervenes in Freudian 
psychoanalysis that attributes the development of  both the individual subject (the human) and the 
collective group (family, tribe, race) to ontogenetic inheritance and biological or evolutionary 
disposition (2008). With sociogeny, Fanon proposes that both the individual subject and collective 
group are socially produced modes of  being human that co-constitute an anti-Black world and 
exclude Blackness from the category of  the human. The experience of  what it is like to be human 
(defined through its exclusion of  Blackness) is therefore mediated by anti-Blackness. Within the 
framework of  sociogeny, perception is a socialized process mediated by anti-Blackness, not a neutral 
biological phenomenon. In an anti-Black world, the perception of  other social phenomena – like 
crime, data, or capture – are attributed to that which is ‘given’ ontogenetically in ‘nature’ and 
‘biology,’ like culture, language or geography (Blackness). How to move beyond the binary of  give 
and take? Refuse anti-Blackness. 
 In addition to capta and perceive, capere is also the root of  the words captive and captivity. In 
Kitchin’s effort to acknowledge the power dynamics at play in data, he shifts from thinking of  data 
as a thing given to a thing taken, and presumes that those from which things are taken are human, 
self-possessing, free subjects or communities. In shifting from give to take, it is not the ruse of  
benevolence that is exposed, but rather the ruse of  whiteness. From within the framework of  
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sociogeny, however, the opposite of  give is not take, it is refuse – the refusal of  anti-Blackness, of  
capture and property. In WDSS, privacy is given as a primary mode of  refusing the extraction of  
data (performed by state and corporate institutions). In this context, refusal is predicated on the self-
possession of  propertied whites. How does the captive and their refusal of  captivity challenge 
theories of  privacy in WDSS? To answer this question, I begin with an analysis of  the increasing use 
of  digital computing and algoirthms in predictive policing. In my analysis, I relate the notion of  
precedent to prediction to demonstrate how privacy for propertied whites in underwritten by the 
criminalization and capture of  Blackness. 
 A wide range of  institutions use algorithms as part of  their day-to-day operations. Many big 
tech corporations, like Alphabet and Amazon, design their own algorithms in-house as an integrated 
component of  their platforms, while the majority of  state or ‘public’ institutions, like police 
departments, school districts and child protective services, purchase software from private-sector 
companies who specialize in algorithm design (Pangburn, 2019). Both big tech corporations and 
‘public’ institutions make data exist through the surveillance of  user engagement with their 
platforms.  Big tech corporations use algorithms to make all kinds of  decisions, from what search 2
results will appear first, to what images will be censored, to what speech will be considered hateful 
(Noble 2018). ‘Public’ institutions use algorithms to make all kinds of  decisions too, from what 
neighborhoods will be policed, to which teachers will be fired, to which mothers will receive child 
care vouchers (O’Neill, 2016). Whether online or ‘in real life’ (IRL), algorithms are replacing human 
beings as decision makers. However, human beings are the programmers of  algorithms, and they are 
also the creators of  the data sets that are used in algorithm design. In this sense, although ‘artificially 
 In this paper I consider the binary between public and private used in WDSS and other settler 2
colonial studies as a naturalized function of  whiteness. Within whiteness, public is used to denote 
property that is not owned by an individual, but rather by the state. This formulation of  public is 
underwritten by technologies of  settler colonialism and transatlantic slavery that continue to 
generate white notions of  property, privacy and publicness through the death, capture and enclosure 
of  Black and Indigenous peoples.
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intelligent,’ algorithms do not function independently of  the biases that inform their design and 
implementation. Artificial intelligence produces predictions about the future based on judgements 
about the past. The intelligence is only ‘artificial’ insofar as it is a machine doing the data analysis 
and calculating the meaning, categorization or judgement, rather than a human. While closely 
associated with computers and digital technologies, an algorithm is simply a process or set of  rules 
to be followed in calculations or other problem-solving operations (OED, “Algorithm”). Laws are 
also algorithms, and while non-digital, they are also based on precedent, using existing judgements 
or rulings to determine how current cases will be decided. Whatever bias is present in ‘naturally 
intelligent’ decision making and policy will translate to artificially intelligent decision making and 
policy. The term artificial refers more to the quantity and speed that a computer program can 
process data than to any transformation in the logic or structure of  the analysis or outcome that an 
algorithm can generate. 
 Algorithms are written through their programmer’s coding of  existing data sets, such as 
profile pictures, arrest records, geographic locations and credit histories. Algorithms do not generate 
new meanings, rather they code data to assign pre-determined meanings to new sets of  information. 
Through the assignment of  these pre-determined meanings, algorithms produce conclusions about 
the meaning of  the data sets, without any input from the people from whom the data has been made 
to exist as data. In the criminal justice system, the integration of  smart technology and aolgorithms 
with ‘crime prevention’ is known as predictive policing. Many police departments across the United 
States now use ‘risk assessment’ software to determine the locations and times of  day that require an 
increased police presence. These areas, known as ‘hot spots,’ are visualized through digital mapping 
using different intensities of  hot and cold colors to denote greater and lesser areas of  ‘risk.’ The 
primary data sets used to design these risk assessment algorithms are arrest records. These records 
are impacted by factors including ‘racial bias,’ or racism that motivates the over-policing and over-
incarceration of  racialized communities. Therefore, arrest records will indicate that the risk of  
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criminal activity increases in Black and Brown neighborhoods, especially poor Black and Brown 
neighborhoods, and will dispatch police officers in greater numbers to those areas (Data 4 Black 
Lives; Angwin, Larson, Mattu and Kirchner, 2016). As data sets used to create predictive policing 
software, arrest records are transformed from archives of  racist policing into ‘unbiased information’ 
used to streamline and sanitize problems including racial profiling. As archives of  anti-Blackness, 
arrest records are made to exist by the state and its police officers who determine that people are 
breaking the law – an anti-Black world makes human behavior and sociality (Blackness) into criminal 
activity that is recorded and collected as data. 
 Predictive policing is frequently cited as an improvement or upgrade to non-algorithmic 
policing that involves ‘human error’ (Ferguson, 2017). Many counties across the United States use 
risk assessment software to mitigate deteriorating community relations in the context of  the 
increased visibility of  police brutality in the era of  social media. One year after Ferguson Police 
officer Darren Wilson murdered 18 year-old Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, the St. Louis 
County police department introduced the predictive policing software HunchLab to its operations. 
HunchLab was implemented in response to the protests following Brown’s murder and the negative 
optics that these uprisings created for the police department. The HunchLab website describes the 
software as “next generation predictive policing” (HunchLab). The word generation refers to the 
‘upgrade’ made to carceral technology that claims to streamline human experience through the 
sanitization of  ‘human error’ in the context of  the criminal justice system. While the word 
generation refers to the evolution of  smart technologies, ‘generation’ also evokes the trans-
generational, centuries-long coding of  Blackness as criminal in propertied white societies – 
racializing surveillance and the coding of  human life (Blackness) is not a phenomenon that emerged 
in tandem with digital computing. Rather than address bias and racial profiling in Ferguson, the St. 
Louis County police department downplayed the crisis as a problem of  ‘human error’ (Chammah, 
2016). Eliminate human error with HunchLab, and they would eliminate the problem of  police 
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brutality. In a comment on the mechanization of  policing in Ferguson, Black studies scholars Fred 
Moten and Stefano Harney identify Darren Wilson as a “Drone” that was “instrumentalized” to 
enact genocide in the state’s defense (2017, 19). As the term drone most often refers to an 
unmanned aerial vehicle capable of  remote sense through remote human control, Moten and 
Harney’s use of  the term enacts a counter-reading of  the idea of  the instrument in relation to anti-
Blackness and policing. In a conversation with Robin Kelley, Moten elaborates on this idea:  
We need to understand what it actually is that the state is defending itself  from and I 
think that in this respect, the particular instances of  Michael Brown’s murder and 
Eric Garner’s murder are worth paying some attention to because what the drone, 
Darren Wilson, shot into that day was insurgent Black life walking down the street. I 
don’t think he meant to violate the individual personhood of  Michael Brown, he was 
shooting at mobile Black sociality walking down the street in a way that he 
understood implicitly constituted a threat to the order he represents and that he is 
sworn to protect (cited in Wang 2018, 192). 
While both Wilson and Brown appeared in public space, the algorithm of  anti-Blackness coded 
Brown as a ‘body’ or property of  the state and therefore public and violable – Wilson’s status as 
‘human,’ self-possessing and private or sovereign is made possible through the arrest, capture and 
destruction of  mobile Black sociality. Or as Black studies and STS scholar Ruha Benjamin writes, 
“vampirically, white vitality feeds on black demise – from the extraction of  (re)productive slave labor 
to build the nation’s wealth to the ongoing erection of  prison complexes to resuscitate rural 
economies – in these ways and many more, white life and black death are inextricable” (41). White 
vitality, including natality, is an anti-social enterprise that instrumentalizes Black death to propel 
theories of  self-possession and ontogenetic inheritance. In WDSS, privacy is conceived of  as a 
corporeal right that extends outwards from the human body. What privacy extends outwards from 
risk? As the long present of  anti-Black violence and police brutality demonstrates, risk assessment 
technologies pre-date digital computing. Physical, social and intimate geographies are coded as risky 
according to racializing algorithms  that pre-date digital computing. In a propertied white world, 3
 A process or set of  rules to be followed in calculations or other problem-solving operations (OED, 3
“Algorithm”).
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Black life is high risk because it threatens whiteness as vitality. White vitality – defined as self-
possession and corporeal privacy from the market – is insured by Black death that fortifies the 
market. WDSS takes up white vitality as its central organizing principle without naming it as such. 
Through this principle, technology is thought as discursive matter, and Black death is overlooked as 
not mattering at all. WDSS studies technology as a tool that has the potential to threaten white 
privacy, while productively indexing Blackness for destruction to sustain and expand the market. 
 In the next section, “Code/space,” I discuss how the idea of  ‘code’ or digital computing is 
deployed in WDSS to fight for the fortification of  propertied whiteness through privacy. I relate this 
fight for privacy and the separation of  reproductive and productive labor that it entails to a different 
kind of  code/space produced through technologies of  e-carceration. Through my examination of  
technologies of  e-carceration, I arrive at the algorithmic racialization of  space prior to software and 
digital computing. I analyze how spaces of  home and the market were coded in the Antebellum era 
according to racist laws defining freedom and capture through Black women’s reproductive labor. 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CODE/SPACE 
 In their 2011 book Code/Space: Software and Everyday Life, WDSS scholars and geographers 
Rob Kitchin and Martin Dodge introduce the term “code/space” to name physical spaces that are 
newly networked through computer code. The authors analyze examples of  code/space including 
airports, offices, cafes and homes, whose pre-digital functions are reengineered by smart technology 
and wireless internet. Kitchin and Dodge give examples of  code/spaces of  home where parents can 
now play with their children, cook dinner, check work emails and make purchases all in the same 
physical space of  their home (2011, 174). The intrusion of  the market into the home through work 
emails, texts, Amazon and the internet of  things (including coffee makers, thermostats, and motor 
vehicle GPS systems) provides increased comfort and convenience while simultaneously 
encroaching on users’ privacy and sense of  sanctuary. The authors describe home space prior to 
code/space as a place for “personal life and privacy from others; a place with layers of  memories 
and meanings from the past; a sanctuary that offers security and safety from the wider world” (159). 
Through computer programming and software, code/space redraws the boundaries between 
productive and reproductive labor that characterize the pre-digital distinction between public and 
private or home life for propertied whites. Where the home and the market were once separate, 
smart technology allows the market into the domestic sphere. 
 To demonstrate this conflict between the increased comfort and convenience that smart 
technology provides and the threat it poses to privacy and sanctuary, the Kitchin and Dodge 
perform audits of  three “typical (Western) homes” (160). In these homes, a variety of  objects are 
embedded with software and are “reconfiguring the social and material relations of  home, often in 
banal and subtle ways” (161). From climate and light control to digital television recording, smart 
technologies allow elements in each home to function according to the preferences of  their users/
consumers/inhabitants, while also collecting information about the habits and purchases of  their 
users/consumers/inhabitants. In exchange for the services provided by the technology, the 
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technology cuts into the users’ privacy by sharing their data (produced through the surveillance of  
their use/consumption) with the technology’s designers/manufacturers. Through user data, big tech 
corporations develop ‘identities’ for who their users are and and shape who they are likely to be in 
the future. Ironically, Kitchin and Dodge do not give any identity markers for the inhabitants of  the 
three homes in their audit, aside from age, employment and home ownership status. The authors go 
into great detail to describe the relationship between code and the internet of  things (including 
coffee makers, thermostats, and motor vehicle GPS systems), but they omit any discussion of  code/
space technologies that mark people (bodies and flesh), including race/gender/sexuality/ability/
status/environment. As an afterthought to the consumer objects in each home, Kitchin and Dodge 
note an RFID tag that is implanted under the skin of  one family’s dog and “render[s] [her] machine 
readable” (161) to provide details such as her home address and current location in case she ever 
gets lost. This is the closest any of  the family members come to biopolitical surveillance, or 
electronic monitoring that is embedded in their physical body. The humans in these “typical 
(Western) homes” are never “rendered machine readable” (161) through mandated electronic 
tagging. While Kitchin and Dodge are concerned that user privacy is undermined in code/space, 
they are not concerned with how code/space compromises users who are used by both state and 
private institutions to code space as criminal, as in the case of  anti-Blackness and predictive policing.  
 In the authors’ conception of  code/space, neither codes nor spaces are theorized as 
producers of  racial hierarchies. In my consideration of  the relationship between racial hierarchies 
and code/space through the position of  the captive, I examine the coding of  people’s bodies 
through software-driven carceral technologies known collectively as as e-carceration. E-carceration is 
gradually replacing analogue technologies of  the prison industrial complex including cash bail. 
Where cash bail is eliminated in states like California and New Jersey, ‘risk assessment’ software is 
used instead by prosecutors and judges to determine whether or not a person who has been arrested 
and is awaiting a trial or plea deal should be released or held in jail. Risk assessment algorithms turns 
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Black peoples’ bodies and other Black intimate geographies into code/space. These patented 
software products are sold to state institutions by the private corporations that design them. There is 
no transparency around the data sets that are used to design the algorithms, or the conclusions that 
the software is programmed to draw when fresh data sets are analyzed (Wang, 2018; Horning, 2012). 
This collision of  privacy, code and space at the level of  the human body is part of  a larger project 
of  color-blind racism and white supremacy  that fuels the shifting prison industrial complex towards 4
e-carceration or “The Newest Jim Crow” (Alexander, 2010; 2018). In addition to risk assessment 
software that determines the terms of  bail, those individuals who have already served time in prison 
are are increasingly released on parole with electronic tags known as ankle monitors. 
 Ankle monitors are programmed with GPS tracking to share the ‘user’s’ location with police 
at all times. Through this tracking, the monitor notifies law enforcement if  the geographic 
boundaries of  the ‘user’s’ parole are violated. As many people released on parole are under house 
arrest, ankle monitors create code/spaces of  e-carceration where people formerly incarcerated in 
prisons and jails are now bound to their homes, or to their immediate neighborhoods in certain 
cases, making it impossible to travel for employment, to visit family or to participate in other types 
of  community. In addition to these movement restrictions, people fitted with electronic tags are 
required to pay up to 35$ a day ($1050 a month) to rent the device (Solon, 2018). For a person 
released on bail and awaiting trial, this cost creates an additional pressure to accept a plea deal in 
order to be free from mounting debt (Kilgore, 2018). Alongside the barriers imposed by software, 
the limitations of  hardware including length of  charge and battery depletion further restrict the 
‘user’s’ movements, as a dead battery will alert the police that the ‘user’ has lost service, which is 
considered a parole violation that can result in arrest and return to prison. In addition to hardware/
ankle monitors, private companies are experimenting with software in the form of  smartphone apps 
 Dylan Rodriguez defines white supremacy as “a logic of  social organization that produces 4
regimented, institutionalized, and militarized conceptions of  hierarchized ‘human difference’” (11). 
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that interface with “tamper proof ” wrist worn monitoring devices networked together through 
Bluetooth (Gable, 2017). The Arkansas-based company E-Cell makes an app to “unlock the future 
of  house arrest monitoring” through GPS tracking, dynamic remote check-ins and biometric 
identification called the House Arrest App (House Arrest App). In a promotional video uploaded by 
E-Cell in 2016, an in-screen video of  the House Arrest Dashboard (the interface used by the 
institution or organization doing the monitoring) shows profile photos of  “clients” spread across a 
map, each with a colored outline to indicate their level of  “compliance” with the terms of  their 
arrest (HouseArrestApp.com). House arrest monitoring apps utilize the same technologies found in 
non-carceral consumer apps such as location sharing and finger print analysis, however the status of  
the user is uniquely marked as unfree and they have no option to opt-out and halt service. 
 In contrast to the smart devices analyzed in ‘typical (Western) homes,’ technologies of  e-
carceration produce ‘home’ as a code/space of  racializing surveillance in the afterlife of  slavery. 
Saidiya Hartman, Professor of  African American literature and Women’s and Gender Studies at 
Columbia University, introduces the afterlife of  slavery in her 2006 book Lose Your Mother: A Journey 
Along the Transatlantic Slave Route: 
“If  slavery persists as an issue in the political life of  black America, it is not because 
of  an antiquarian obsession with bygone days or the burden of  a too-long memory, 
but because black lives are still imperiled and devalued by a racial calculus and a 
political arithmetic that were entrenched centuries ago. This is the afterlife of  
slavery--skewed life chances, limited access to health and education, premature death, 
incarceration, and impoverishment” (2007, 6). 
In the afterlife of  slavery, both state and private actors have introduced software to calculate the 
“skewed life chances, limited access to health and education, premature death, incarceration, and 
impoverishment” that persist for Black people in America. In the afterlife of  slavery, privacy is not 
given, nor is it taken, rather it is captured through anti-Black racism and violence. Recall that Kitchin 
and Dodge describe home as a space that provides “personal life and privacy from others; a place 
with layers of  memories and meanings from the past; a sanctuary that offers security and safety 
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from the wider world” (159). They theorize code/space as untouched by racial hierarchies, when in 
fact racial hierarchies produce the conception of  code/space as non-racial. To expand on how racial 
hierarchies produces code/space, as non-racial, I turn to the algorithmic racialization of  space prior 
to software and digital computing to analyze how spaces of  home and the market were coded in the 
Antebellum era according to racist laws defining freedom and capture through Black women’s 
reproductive labor. 
 As Hartman writes, “the line of  division between the market and the household which 
distinguished the public and the domestic and divided productive and reproductive labor for 
propertied whites does not hold when describing the enslaved and the carceral landscape of  
plantation” (2016, 168). Propertied whites maintained the distinction between private and public 
space through the unfreedom of  enslaved people of  African descent and whose labors, both 
productive and reproductive, were captured to drive the market. In the context of  the antebellum 
era and racial slavery, code/space might have referred to the reproductive systems of  enslaved 
women of  African descent. The law that the free or slave status of  the child followed the status of  
the mother – partus sequitur ventrem – maintained racial hierarchies and the plantation economy by 
coding the children of  enslaved women of  African descent. According to the white settler colonial 
state, enslaved people of  African descent were born into debt by virtue of  being coded as property. 
Under certain agreements with propertied white slave-owning individuals, they could buy their 
freedom, thus paying off  their debt, in order to be recognized by the state as free. In this sense, 
according to the state, enslaved people of  African descent were born into the market as property, 
and thus had no privacy from the market that was underwritten by their capture. 
 Jennifer Morgan, Professor of  History in the department of  Social and Cultural Analysis at 
New York University, analyzes the relationship between slavery, reproductive labor, the market, 
property and privacy in the British colonies that would later become the independent United States: 
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Freedom from the market—obviously an aspirational freedom for myriad unfree 
white laborers—would ultimately become a defining mark of  the intimate geography 
of  public and private space; but it was only conferred on those deemed to have a 
legitimate claim. For women of  African descent, both enslaved and free, the looming 
danger of  the market would immediately encroach on their pregnancies and the 
births of  their infants. The reach of  the market breached their corporeal boundaries 
in ways neither subtle nor incremental. And thus exposure to the market became as 
intimate as the feelings of  affection and as interior as a quickening pregnancy (13). 
in the settler colonies, women of  African descent experienced the market at the level of  biopolitical 
surveillance. Their flesh was coded as public insofar as the market captured their most intimate 
experiences through racial slavery. This saturation of  the market with human flesh upturns Kitchin 
and Dodge’s conception of  private and public space that gives rise to code/space in the digital age. 
While Antebellum laws no longer code people and space, the plantation economy they guaranteed is 
present in what Geographer and Black Studies scholar Katherine McKittrick calls “plantation 
futures.” In the last section, “The Mobilization of  White Privacy,” I follow the time-space named by 
plantation futures to switch gears and relate digital computing and white privacy to an older 
technology, analogue photography, that created and secured code/space and generated criminal 
databases long before the advent of  digital computer code and algorithms. 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THE MOBILIZATION OF WHITE PRIVACY 
 McKittrick defines “plantation futures” as “a conceptualization of  time-space that tracks the 
plantation toward the prison and the impoverished and destroyed city sectors and, consequently, 
brings into sharp focus the ways the plantation is an ongoing locus of  anti-black violence and death” 
(McKittrick, 2013, 2-3). McKittrick cites George L. Beckford’s “plantation economy thesis” where 
Beckford analyzes how the transatlantic slave trade “instituted a racialized economy that lingered 
long after emancipation and independence movements in the Americas; and that the protracted 
colonial logic of  the plantation came to define many aspects of  postslave life” (cited in Mckittrick, 
2013, 3). In this section I examine an analogue technology – mobile analogue photography – that 
emerged as a colonial logic of  capture after the period of  Reconstruction in America, and that 
became widely used during Jim Crow. Through mobile analogue photography, the colonial logic of  
the plantation came to define legal frameworks related to privacy through notions of  ‘corporeal’ and 
‘incorporeal’ rights. 
 After the Civil War and Reconstruction, propertied white society re-defined private and 
public space through the rise of  mobile media technologies including analogue photography. Where 
propertied whites used analogue photography to code whiteness with individual identity, citizenship 
and a right to the self, they also used it to code Blackness as criminal and hyper-sexual through 
surveillance in the form of  police records, social scientific studies and popular culture. In the hands 
of  propertied whites, analogue photography reinforced the inherent violability and publicness of  
Blackness. At the same time, the making-mobile of  analogue photography in the late 19th century 
introduced problems for propertied whites who were used to sensing themselves as rights-bearing 
and self-possessing subjects. As changes in technology allowed photographers to move out of  the 
studio and into the street, professional photographers captured pictures of  propertied whites 
without their consent. In fact, the idea of  having to consent to having one’s photograph taken did 
not yet exist until mobile analogue photography and “The Right to Privacy” began to circulate. 
!18
 In 1890, attorneys Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published “The Right to Privacy” in 
the Harvard Law Review. The article was written in response to the mobilization of  analogue 
photography and its encroachments into the public sphere. Warren and Brandeis argued for the 
regulation of  representation and the right to privacy from media and recording in public space for 
propertied whites. Their arguments unfolded from the declaration that “the term ‘property’ has 
grown to comprise every form of  possession – tangible as well as intangible” (193). Through 
changing technologies, propertied whites were dispossessed of  their intangible properties – their 
ability to self-represent and their entitlement or ownership over such self-representations. In 
response to this dispossession, Warren and Brandeis sought to “protect the privacy of  the individual 
from invasion either by the too enterprising press, the photographer, or the possessor of  any other 
modern device for recording or reproducing scenes or sounds” (206). It may seem hard to imagine a 
time when photography was a specialized enterprise, rather than a function embedded in every 
smartphone, but in the late 19th century there were no laws to govern the use of  photography in 
relation to consent and privacy. 
 Warren and Brandeis argue that recording technologies interrupt the sanctity of  private life 
through their prediction that “what is whispered in the closet halls shall be proclaimed from the 
house-tops” (195). They advocated for changes in the legal conception of  property, arguing that 
from “corporeal property” – possession or ownership of  one’s body – rises “incorporeal property” 
– possessions arising from corporeal property, such as whispers, thoughts, feelings, and expressions 
– effectively broadening the legal boundaries of  whiteness to include those biosocial phenomena 
that can be recorded through representational media technologies (193). In sum, “The Right to 
Privacy” argued that “the individual is entitled to decide whether that which is his shall be given to 
the public” (199). Through the right to privacy, boundaries of  individual white privacy extended into 
the public sphere in the terms of  the “incorporeal property” of  any self-possessing individual. 
Analogue photography reengineered the boundaries between private and public space to create 
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further immunities and protections for white people at the expense of  Black life, in much the same 
way that computer code transforms the boundaries between private and public space today.    
 Analogue photography may seem distant from artificial intelligence and computer code, but 
as an emerging mobile technology in the 19th century, it introduced portable and ‘artificial,’ or 
mediated, perception that replicated ‘natural’ vision. Outside of  the calls for incorporeal property 
for propertied whites, this re-definition, in tandem with emancipation and Jim Crow, lead to the use 
of  photography to capture Blackness as a permanent condition of  dispossession. Anti-Black terror 
was captured in consumer photographic prints and postcards, while Black urban life was 
criminalized and studied by sociologists and police who used photography to code blackness as 
wayward and destitute (Hartman, 2019). Written in 1890, twenty-five years after the Black Codes and 
over ten years into the Jim Crow era, “The Right to Privacy” was published alongside lynch laws and 
vagrancy laws that enacted violence and capture in efforts to determine where, when and how newly 
free Black people could live. These racist laws were written at the same time that convict 
photography was introduced as a technology to build criminal databases in newly formed police 
departments in US cities such as Chicago and New York City (Pareneti, 2003). “The Right to 
Privacy” is an important document in WDSS because it grounds contemporary digital technologies 
(and thus the study of  study of  data and surveillance absent of  anti-Blackness) in a history of  racist 
divisions between the right to privacy and self-possession, and exposure to the market through the 
dispossession on the body as object of  property. Mobile analogue photography introduced a crisis 
of  privacy for propertied whites that resulted in whiteness being re-defined and expanded to include 
the self-fashioning of  ‘incorporeal property.’ At the same time, and with the same technology, 
propertied whites represented Blackness as wayward, uncivilized, and criminal. Photography became 
a new means to continue to code physical, social and intimate spaces as anti-Black, with certain 
white aesthetic markers indicating an overflow of  publicness, or lack of  privacy, in Black 
neighborhoods and communities to signal Black criminality as a threat to propertied white sociality. 
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Through photography outside the bounds of  the studio, scientists, social scientists, cultural 
producers and police all made data exist from the ‘incorporeal properties’ of  Black people, whose 
expressions, thoughts and feelings were captured as objects of  property through various analogue 
algorithmic calculations in the afterlife of  slavery. In these databases of  the white gaze turned to 
Black life and death, the mass of  propertied whites saw poverty, criminality, destitution, 
lasciviousness, and animality. What these databases capture is white privacy projected as risk and 
debt upon the dispossessed, so that whiteness may retain its absolute incorporeal value. 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CONCLUSION 
 In this paper I have analyzed white conceptions of  data and surveillance to demonstrate how 
privacy persists in WDSS as a means to resist the intrusion of  the market into the private lives of  
propertied whites, at the expense of  Black life and its enduring capture and exposure to the market 
in and as death. At the beginning of  my argument I resolved that the binary of  give and take that 
defines data in WDSS would be better understood as captivity and its refusal. I analyzed 
technologies of  e-carceration in relation to the theory of  code/space to show how white 
conceptions of  privacy erase the reality of  biopolitical tracking and surveillance of  racialized 
individuals and communities. I pointed to an example from scholars Rob Kitchin and Martin Dodge 
of  a “typical (Western)” family dog outfitted with an RFID remote tracking device as the sole 
instance in the theory of  code/space where biopolitical surveillance is mentioned as a form of  
code/space, coding the space of  the body or flesh for capture. Then I demonstrated that code/
space, when considered in relation to e-carceration, must be read a theory that upholds the 
destruction of  insurgent Black sociality, as it describes changes to technology and environment that 
erase the violent apprehension of  corporeality in Black communities. I chose to follow my 
discussion of  code/space and e-carceration with a reading of  “The Right to Privacy” and analogue 
photography to demonstrate that digital technology does not break with previous regimes of  white 
privacy from the market. Through my analysis of  privacy in the 19th century in relation to mediation 
and perception, I connected the extension of  white rights in the face of  new technology to 
plantation futures where white privacy is maintained and upheld through ever changing technologies 
of  anti-Blackness. In my reading of  capture across different technologies, I placed WDSS and its 
preoccupations in the afterlife of  slavery as an anti-Black discourse underwritten by capture. In 
WDSS, self-possession is an assumed right of  the subject that is never questioned, and the 
racializing effects of  code remain unseen, despite WDSS’ alleged focus on making the unseen of  
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data and surveillance visible. Through my case study of  WDSS and computer code, I bring the 
refusal of  white privacy to bear on studies of  data, surveillance and abolition. 
!23
REFERENCES 
Alexander, Michelle. The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of  Colorblindness. New  
 York City: The New Press, 2010. 
Alexander, Michelle. “The Newest Jim Crow.” NY Times, November 8, 2019. https:// 
 www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/opinion/sunday/criminal-justice-reforms-race- 
 technology.html 
Angwin, Julia, Jeff  Larson, Surya Mattu, and Lauren Kirchner. “Machine Bias.” ProPublica,  
 May 23, 2016. https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in- 
 criminal-sentencing. 
Becker, Howard. “Science, culture, and society.” Philosophy of  Science, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp.  
 273-87. 
Benjamin, Ruha. “Black AfterLives Matter: Cultivating Kinfulness as Reproductive Justice.”  
 Making Kin Not Population, edited by Adele E. Clarke and Donna Haraway, pp. 41-51.  
 Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2018. 
Browne, Simone. Dark Matters: On the Surveillance of  Blackness. Durham: Duke University   
 Press, 2015. 
Chammah, Maurice. “Policing the Future.” The Verge, February 3, 2015. https:// 
 www.theverge.com/2016/2/3/10895804/st-louis-police-hunchlab-predictive-policing- 
 marshall-project. 
Data 4 Black Lives. “About Data for Black Lives.” Data4BlackLives.com. http://d4bl.org/ 
 about.html (accessed March 2, 2019). 
Dubrofsky, Rachel E. and Magnet, Shoshana Amielle. Feminist Surveillance Studies. Durham:  
 Duke University Press, 2015. 
Fanon, Frantz. Black Skin, White Masks. New York City: Grove Press, 2008. 
Ferguson, Andre Guthrie. The Rise of  Big Data Policing: Surveillance, Race, and the Future of   
 Law Enforcement. New York: New York University Press, 2017. 
Gable, Robert. “Let’s Stop Using Ankle Bracelets to Monitor Offenders.” IEEE Spectrum,   
 accessed January 19, 2019, July 20, 2017. https://spectrum.ieee.org/consumer-electronics/ 
 portable-devices/lets-stop-using-ankle-bracelets-to-monitor-offenders. 
Gilmore, Ruth Wilson. Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing  
 California. Oakland: University of  California Press, 2007. 
Gilroy, Paul. The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness. Cambridge: Harvard   
 University Press, 1995. 
Hartman, Saidiya. Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments: Intimate Histories of  Social Upheaval.  
!24
 New York City: W. W. Norton & Company, 2019. 
Hartman, Saidiya. “The Belly of  the World: A Note on Black Women’s Labors.” Souls, Vol. 18,  
 No. 1, 2016, pp. 166-173, DOI: 10.1080/10999949.2016.1162596. 
Hartman, Saidiya. Lose Your Mother: A Journey Along the Transatlantic Slave Route. New York:  
 Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006. 
Horning, Rob. “Predictive Analytics and Information Camouflage.” The New Inquiry, February  
 17, 2012. 
House Arrest App. “HouseArrestApp.com." https://housearrestapp.com/ 
Kitchin, Rob. The Data Revolution: Big Data, Open Data, Data Infrastructures & Their  
 Consequences. Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2014. 
Kitchin, Rob and Martin Dodge. Code/Space: Software and Everyday Life. Cambridge: MIT  
 Press, 2011. 
Kilgore, James. “The First Step Act Opens the Door to Digital Incarceration.” Truthout,  
 December 18, 2018. https://truthout.org/articles/the-first-step-act-opens-the-door-to- 
 digital-incarceration/ 
Mckittrick, Katherine. “Plantation Futures.” Small Axe, Vol. 17, No. 42 (November  
 2013), pp. 1-15. 
Morgan, Jennifer. “Partus sequitur ventrem: Law, Race, and Reproduction in Colonial Slavery.”  
 Small Axe, Vol. 22, No.1 (March 2018), pp. 1-17, DOI 10.1215/07990537-4378888. 
Moten, Fred and Stefano Harney. “Leave Our Mikes Alone.”  Unpublished paper, 2017, accessed  
 on November 12, 2018, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/ 
 53a0503be4b0a429a2614e8b/t/59d81c2eedaed84653048f0d/1507335215476/Harney- 
 Moten.pdf.  
Noble, Safiya. Algorithms of  Oppression. New York: New York University Press, 2018. 
O’Neil, Cathy. Weapons of  Math Destruction. New York: Crown, 2016. 
Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “Algorithm,” accessed March 20, 2019, https:// 
 en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/algorithm. 
Pangburn, DJ. “How to lift the veil off  hidden algorithms.” Fast and Company, January 28,  
 2019. https://www.fastcompany.com/90292210/transparency-government-software- 
 algorithms 
Pareneti, Christian. The Soft Cage: Surveillance in America from Slave Passes to the War on  
 Terror. New York: Basic Books, 2003. 




Robinson, Cedric. Black Marxism. Chapel Hill: University of  North Carolina Press, 1983. 
Rodriguez, Dylan. Forced Passages: Imprisoned Radical Intellectuals and the U.S. Prison  
 Regime. Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota Press, 2006. 
Shabazz, Rashad. Spatializing Blackness: Architectures of  Confinement and Black  
 Masculinity in Chicago. Urbana: University of  Illinois Press, 2015  
Solon, Olivia. “‘Digital shackles’: the unexpected cruelty of  ankle monitors.” The Guardian,  
 August 28, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/aug/28/digital-shackles- 
 the-unexpected-cruelty-of-ankle-monitors 
Wang, Jackie. Carceral Capitalism. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2018. New Left Review, Vol. 13, Jan- 
 Feb, 2002. 
Warren, Samuel D. and Louis D. Brandeis. “The Right to Privacy.” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 4  
 (1890): 193–220.
!26
